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 Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan
 in 1937
 Robert Weinberg
 Recent scholarship on the purges and Great Terror has contributed
 immensely to our understanding of the stalinist political system that
 emerged in the mid-1930s. Research by J. Arch Getty and Gabor Rit-
 tersporn, among others, has challenged the totalitarian perspective
 that views the Terror as part of a grand scheme designed by Stalin to
 silence his opponents in the Party and government, establish his per-
 sonal dictatorship and coerce society into unquestioning submission.'
 Instead, these historians emphasize the limits of power and control
 wielded by the national leadership which found itself at times frus-
 trated in its efforts to impose its will on both society and regional party
 organizations. They conclude that the "cleansing" of the Party and
 government was the partial product of a conflict between national and
 subnational officials, with initiative from below sometimes playing as
 important a role as central directives in fueling the purges. Among the
 merits of this research is that it shifts our attention from national elites
 to regional functionaries, pays close attention to the daily functioning
 of local politics and distinguishes among the phases of the purge phe-
 nomenon. Getty's and Rittersporn's conclusions are drawn from care-
 ful readings of the Smolensk Archives; studies of the purges in other
 locales would undoubtedly shed additional light on this tragic period
 in Soviet history.
 Generous support for this project was provided by Swarthmoore College, the Interna-
 tional Research and Exchanges Board, the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad
 program and the Hoover Institution. I would like to extend a special thanks to Galina
 V. Gorskaia of the Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii in
 Moscow and Liudmila N. Shavul'skaia of the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Evreiskoi Avtononlnoi
 Oblasti for their gracious reception and assistance. Special thanks toJ. Arch Getty and
 Thompson Bradley for their assistance in translating and clarifying certain phl-ases,
 and toJohn Stephan for his valuable criticism.
 1. See J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Recon-
 sidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and idem, "Party
 and Purge in Smnolensk: 1933-1937," Slavic Review 42, no. 1 (1983): 60-79 and the
 following works by Gabor Rittersporn: "Soviet Politics in the 1930s: Rehabilitating
 Society," Studies in Comparative Communism 19, no. 2 (1986): 105-28; "Rethinking Sta-
 linism," Russian History/Histoire Russe 11, no. 4 (1984): 343-61; "Societe et appareil
 d'Etat sovietique (1936-1938): contradictions et interf6rences," Annales E.S.C. 34, no.
 4 (1979): 843-67; "The 1930s in the Longue Duree of Soviet History," Telos, no. 53
 (1982): 107-16; Simplifications staliniennes et complications sovietiques: Tensions sociales et
 conflits politiques en URSS, 1933-1953 (Paris, 1988); "Staline en 1938: Apogee du verbe
 et defaite politique," Libre, no. 6 (1979): 99-164; "L'Etat en lutte contre lui-rneme:
 Tensions sociales et conflits politiques en URSS, 1936-1938, "Libre, no. 4 (1978):
 3-38. Graeine Gill's recent The Origins of the Stalinist Political System (Camlbridge: Cami-
 bridge University Press, 1990) offers an excellent historiographical overview in his
 introduction.
 Slavic Review 52, no. 1 (Spring 1993)
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 This study focuses on an area some five thousand miles to the east,
 on Birobidzhan, the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR)
 located along the Chinese border in the Soviet far east. Materials from
 recently opened party archives in Moscow and Birobidzhan throw into
 relief the dynamics of the purges in the JAR and add to our under-
 standing of a purge in the making, especially regarding how one rank-
 ing party official was swept into the maelstrom of the Great Terror.
 The specific purge examined here is that of Matvei Pavlovich Khavkin,
 the First Party Secretary of the JAR, who fell victim to security forces
 sometime in fall 1937. Examination of the fate that befell Khavkin
 clarifies the roles played by national and local pressures and person-
 alities in generating the attack on him, and reveals the tensions and
 conflicts animating political life in the JAR. Study of Khavkin's purge
 demonstrates that local political developments took on a life of their
 own, despite the fact that national events and policies gave birth to
 and subsequently helped shape them.
 Matvei Khavkin had a career that was typical of those Jewish work-
 ers who joined the bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic
 Workers' Party before the revolution.2 Born in 1897 in the shtetl town
 of Rogachev (near Gomel) in White Russia, Khavkin became a tailor's
 apprentice at age eight in order to help support his family. Influenced
 by an older brother who was a revolutionary, he joined the political
 underground in 1913 and the bolsheviks in 1916. For the next two
 years Khavkin was in charge of bolshevik activities in his home town
 and, after the bolshevik seizure of power, he moved to Gomel where
 he helped establish the Soviet regime. He became involved in work for
 the Cheka and in 1919 set off for the Polish front, only to be captured
 by enemy forces. Khavkin managed to escape from prison in Warsaw,
 however, and found his way to Brest-Litovsk where he distinguished
 himself as a member of the Revolutionary Committee and military
 commander. Towards the end of the civil war he helped carry out a
 party purge in the town of Klintsy (not far from Minsk) and from 1922
 to 1924 he served as a party secretary and member of the soviet in
 Gomel province.
 His superiors in the Party decided to send Khavkin to a higher
 party school in 1925 as a reward for his efforts. After finishing his
 course of studies, he spent the next several years overseeing the work
 of the secret police in Gomel province and the Russian Republic. A
 1926 report from party leaders in Gomel states that Khavkin showed
 "initiative and organizational capabilities" and had "correctly imple-
 mnented the party line" during his years in the region. In 1928 he was
 assigned to Kazakhstan where he was chair of the Party Control Com-
 2. Material on Khavkin's life is taken from a 1992 exhibit on the stalinist repres-
 sions at the Museum of the Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan. See also
 Tribuna, no. 9(178) (15 September 1934):- 8-9; S. lakubson, "Sud'ba iz 'zabytoi pravdy,"'
 Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (28 October 1989); Organizatsiia KPSS Evreiskoi Avtonomnoi Ob-
 lasti, 1934-1985: Khronika (Khabarovsk, 1986), 23.
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 mission and responsible for a purge in 1929-1930. For his work he
 was given the rank of Honorary Chekist and awarded the Order of the
 Red Banner. He was then appointed first secretary of the party orga-
 nization in Smolensk city, a post he held until 1934 when the Central
 Committee, at the behest of Lazar' Kaganovich and Viacheslav Molo-
 tov, decided to transfer himn to the newly established JAR as a member
 of the Party's Organizational Committee. His appointment as first party
 secretary became official at the First Party Conference of the JAR, held
 in June 1935. Stalin reportedly quipped after meeting Khavkin in 1934,
 "This Jew is smarter than most."3
 Organized settlement of the territory that would become the JAR
 had begun in 1928 when the government designated it as the national
 territory of Soviet Jews.4 Given the inflated expectations of the initial
 five-year plans, officials had grandiose plans for the JAR. However, a
 host of social, political and economic obstacles worked against mass
 settlement of the region by large numbers of Jews. By 1937 they com-
 prised only about 20,000 of the approximately 120,000 residents of the
 JAR. As party chief, Khavkin was responsible for overseeing the overall
 development of the JAR but, like many counterparts throughout the
 Soviet Union, he had little success in mobilizing the forces of the Party,
 government and society to mneet the targets set by government planners
 in industry, agriculture, housing and culture.
 Khavkin's 1937 elimination as party chief in the JAR should be
 seen in the larger context of the series of internal purges that the Party
 had conducted within its ranks after the 1933-1934 expulsion of 22
 percent of the party's national membership.5 That purge found party
 members "undesirable" because they undermined and violated party
 policy, lacked the requisite moral rectitude, or were politically passive,
 class-aliens or guilty of careerism. Local purge officials were cautioned
 not to subject rank-and-file members to interrogations of sophisticated
 questions about the party program and history; they were instructed
 to reduce to candidate status but not to expel members who lacked
 sufficient levels of political and ideological education.6 The responses
 from party m-iembers in the JAR in fall 1933 reveal that many comn-
 3. Quote taken fi-om the exhibit on the purges at the Museum of the Jewish
 Autonomous Region.
 4. See Solomon Schwarz, ThleJews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse Univer-sity
 Press, 1951) and idem, "Birobidzhan: An Experimient in Jewish Colonization" in Rus-
 sian Jezvry, 1917-1967, eds. Gregor Aronson, Jacob Frumnkin, Alexis Goldenweiser, et
 al. (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1969), 342-95; Nora Levin, The Jews ifn the Soviet Union
 since 1917: Paradox of Survival (New York: New York University Press, 1988), vol. 1,
 chap. 13; Henri Sloves, LEtatJuif de l'Union Sovietique (Paris, 1982); and Chimi-ein Abi-ami-
 sky, "The Biro-Bidzhain Project, 1927-1959," in TheJews in Soviet Russia since 1917, 3rd
 ed., ed. Lionel Kochan (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1978), 64-77, for useful
 overviews of the JAR from its inception to the end of the 1930s. The most compr-e-
 hensive accounit is provided in Hebrew by Jacob Lvavi,Jezvish Colonization in Birobidzhan
 (Jerusalem, 1965).
 5. Getty, "Party and Purge in Smolensk, 1933-1937," 69.
 6. Getty, The Origins of the Great Purges, 48-57.
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 munists were not only utterly ignorant of the intricacies of party ide-
 ology but even of major current events. For example, more than a
 handful did not know who Stalin was! Several responded to the ques-
 tion, "Who is Comrade Stalin?" with the disingenuous but honest, "A
 person." On the whole, members who were deemed "politically igno-
 rant" were reduced to candidate status; such candidates for party mem-
 bership lost that status. However, members were expelled who were
 found guilty of poor party work, such as failure to implement party
 directives and rudeness to subordinates, or of concealing a checkered
 political past (e.g. fighting for the whites or not admitting former mem-
 bership in the Bund or a Zionist organization).7
 The next efforts of the national political leadership to rid the Party
 of members considered undeserving of party cards occurred in con-
 junction with the "verification and exchange of party documents cam-
 paign" in 1935 and 1936. Not only were the personal and work lives
 of communists once again subject to party scrutiny, but political reli-
 ability in the sense of holding (or once holding) trotskyite or zinov-
 ievite views intruded into the purge process. Thus, party activists were
 expelled for shoddy record keeping, not maintaining complete and
 accurate membership lists, as well as for drunkenness, "moral deprav-
 ity" and shirking of party responsibilities. Some rank-and-file members
 were disciplined for not being able to read and write, others for having
 lost their party cards, while others were accused of insufficient party
 vigilance, trotskyism, ties with foreign elements, and white guardism.
 According to party documents, some 217 party members in the JAR
 were expelled by spring 1937 as a result of this camipaign; and a recent
 article by a member of the Party Control Commission in theJAR states
 that some 400 full and candidate members were purged from the mnid-
 to late 1930s.8
 Khavkin's troubles began after the February-March 1937 plenum
 of the Central Committee at which, among other things, Stalin and
 Andrei Zhdanov called for self-criticism at party meetings and raised
 the specter that party leaders themselves could be suspect. As Getty
 points out, rank-and-file members in the Smolensk region responded
 to the national leadership's message to be more vigilant by, in the
 words of a Pravda editorial, engaging in "severe" and "pitiless" criti-
 cism of local leaders.') In theJAR Khavkin found himself the target of
 7. See Partiinyi arkhiv obkoma KPSS Evreiskoi Avtonomnnoi Oblasti, f. 6, op. 1, d. 43.
 Hereafter cited as PAOEAO.
 8. F. Sachuk, "Vozvrashchennaia chest'," Birobildzhanskaia zvezdai (4 Marl-ch 1990):
 2 and PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 16, 127-31 and 143-45, and d. 21, 33-34. See also the
 papers of the Otdel rukovodiashchikh partiinykh organov of the Centr-al Commiittee of the
 Commniiiiiiist Party of the Soviet Union- at the Rossiiskii tsenitr khraneniiia i izuchenilia
 dokutmenitov noveishei istorii in Moscow, especially f. 17, op. 21, d. 5403, 9-19, d. 5432,
 174 and 182-182 ob., d. 5547, 60-61, 95-110 and 179, d. 5549, 93-97, 157 and 161,
 and d. 5550, 52-56, 60, 75-76, 95-97, 101, and 131-32. Hereafter- citecl as CC-ORPO.
 9. Getty, The Origins of the Great Pto.ges, 149-50.
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 a vociferous campaign waged by local party members to strip him not
 only of his post as first party secretary but of his party card as well.
 At one of a series of meetings, held from 29 March to 1 April by
 Birobidzhan party activists, Khavkin revealed that he had concealed
 from the Party that he had been a member of the trotskyite opposition
 in 1923. His admission came in the midst of accusations by party mem-
 bers (who apparently took the speeches and resolutions of the Febru-
 ary-March plenum to heart) that he had stifled inner party democracy
 and suppressed criticism of his failings as an administrator. In partic-
 ular, Khavkin was held responsible for underfulfillment of the plan on
 housing and settlement of migrants. He was also charged with being
 "arrogant" and "conceited," promoting obsequiousness and encour-
 aging pomp and circumstance designed to glorify him as leader of the
 JAR. One indicator of Khavkin's control over party members is re-
 vealed in the telling statement of one candidate member to the obkom
 (oblastnyi komitet, the leading party institution in the JAR): "If I am not
 correct, then only the first secretary of the obkom can correct me." Or,
 as Khavkin reportedly responded to a group of critics at an early April
 meeting of party activists, "Don't forget that I still have the final
 word." ")
 The heated exchanges at these meetings stirred up party members
 in the JAR, whose behavior may also have been energized by news of
 a meeting between Khavkin and Georgii Malenkov who, as head of the
 Central Committee's Department of Leading Party Organs (Otdel ru-
 kovodiashchikh partiinykh organov) supervised the purges and had sum-
 moned the JAR's first secretary to Moscow in March. Alexander Sutu-
 rin, a journalist who has devoted his recent endeavors to the study of
 the purges in the Soviet far east, suggests that Malenkov told Khavkin
 he was disappointed with the results of the "verification and exchange
 of party documents" campaign in theJAR.' Khavkin's admission of a
 trotskyite past may have been a response to this barely disguised threat
 and an attempt to save his political career, if not his life. Reports of
 the meeting may have prompted speculation among local JAR activists
 that Khavkin was already in hot water and therefore a legitimate target
 for attack.
 When the obkom held a plenum several days later on 6 April, it
 decided to "dismiss" (sniat') Khavkin as party secretary and instructed
 the primary party organization to review his membership. However,
 the kraikom (kraevoi komitet, leading party organization of the Far East-
 ern Territory, headquartered in Khabarovsk and immediately superior
 to the obkom of theJAR) informed the plenum that its action violated
 10. Tribuna, no. 8(229) (30 April 1937): 5 and 7; Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (8 April
 1937 and 9 May 1937).
 11. It is unclear upon what evidence Sutuiin bases his conclusion regarding the
 conversation between Khavkin and Malenkov. A. Suturin, Delo kraevogo iasshtaba (Kha-
 barovsk, 1991), 122 and idemn, "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (12 May
 1989).
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 party rules since it could not dismiss Khavkin without the preliminary
 approval of the kraikom. The obkom was annoyed with the kraikom's
 position but nonetheless agreed to reformulate its resolution to read,
 "It is impossible for Khavkin to remain at work as first secretary"; it
 then requested the kraikom to resolve the issue of the "immediate dis-
 missal" (nemedlennoe sniatie) of Khavkin as first secretary.'2
 The plenum found Khavkin guilty of encouraging "toadyism, pom-
 posity, political arrogance and intrigue" and urging communists to
 "attack each other." Moreover, "a widely developed sense of family
 loyalty and cliquishness (semeistvennost') has led to an absence of col-
 legiality in the obkom, the burying of inner party democracy, the iso-
 lation of the obkom from the party masses and the loss in taste for party
 work." Khavkin surrounded himself "with his own people" whom he
 had brought from Smolensk and "who zealously groveled to create a
 stifling atmosphere in which comrades brave enough to criticize Khav-
 kin were persecuted." This state of affairs, according to the plenum,
 contributed to a lack of party vigilance that was responsible for the
 dismal record of the Party to meet the goals of increased settlement
 and economic development.'3
 Criticism of Khavkin intensified in April and May, with grievances
 against him appearing in both a prominent regional newspaper and
 national journal. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda, the major party daily of the
 Far Eastern Territory published in Khabarovsk, paid careful attention
 to developments in neighboring Birobidzhan and kept its readers
 abreast of the accusations lodged against Khavkin at various meetings
 held by the Party in theJAR. By its publication of articles condemning
 Khavkin's style of leadership and political errors, the paper played a
 crucial role in mobilizing opinion against Khavkin. For example, the
 11 April issue reported that Khavkin had plotted against Semen Kre-
 mer, the secretary of the Komsomol in the JAR, because Kremer had
 learned about Khavkin's "trotskyite past." According to this account,
 when Kremer denounced Khavkin to party superiors in Moscow and
 Khabarovsk, the JAR leader instructed his cronies in the obkom to man-
 ufacture evidence damning Kremer as "an accomplice of the trot-
 skyites"; Kremer was expelled from the Party as a result of these mach-
 inations. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda also reported that the Russian- and
 Yiddish-language dailies in the JAR worked closely with Khavkin to
 conceal the mistakes of his leadership and suppressed all criticism of
 the obkom. l4
 National airing of the accusations against Khavkin took place on
 the pages of Tribuna, the journal published by the Society for the Ag-
 ricultural Settlement of Jewish Toilers in the Soviet Union (Obshchestvo
 12. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5552, 60; PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 22, 17.
 13. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 23, 3-5.
 14. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (11 April 1937, 26 April 1937 and 9 May 1937). See also
 PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1. d. 22, 9-13 for additional material on Ki-emer's struggle with
 Khavkin.
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 po zemelt'nomu ustroistvu trudiashchikhsia v SSSR). Tribuna began publish-
 ing articles critical of Khavkin at the end of April. Like Tikhookeanskaia
 zvezda, it reported the denunciations of Khavkin and contended that
 his "trotskyite proclivitie's" were responsible for the dismal state of
 affairs in the JAR. Thus, it was no surprise that enemies of the people
 had escaped detection as long as they did. Tribuna repeated the com-
 plaint of a supplier of essential consumer items, Kogan, who was kept
 busy attending to Khavkin's demands for frequent banquets and din-
 ners despite severe shortages of kerosene, salt and matches. Tribuna
 also published details about Khavkin's "trotskyite activities" in 1923:
 not only did he belong to "an anti-party group" but he delivered "trot-
 skyite speeches" and even was sent from Moscow to Gomel to conduct
 "trotskyite agitation." Interestingly, Tribuna frequently couched its at-
 tack on Khavkin in language designed to resonate among its primarily
 Jewish readership. For example, his control of the obkom was likened
 to the authoritarian control of the elders in the kahal, the traditional
 Jewish community council; in another article critical of certain aspects
 of cultural work in the JAR, Khavkin's leadership style was likened to
 that of an "insulted shtetl synagogue elder." 15
 Members of the Party at the highest levels in Moscow had evidently
 been closely following developments in theJAR and were in possession
 of materials forwarded by the kraikom after the 6 April obkom plenum.
 On 10 May the Politburo resolved to accept the suggestion of the Far
 Eastern kraikom to "relieve" (osvobodit') Khavkin of his position as first
 secretary of the JAR. The Politburo also "brought Khavkin under the
 jurisdiction" or "put Khavkin at the disposal" (otozval ego v raspor-
 iazhenie) of the Central Committee.'6 It is crucial to note the difference
 between the demand of the obkom to dismiss (sniat') Khavkin from his
 responsibilities and review his party membership and the Politburo's
 decision to relieve or release (osvobodit'), which was a less severe pun-
 ishment. Party personnel were periodically relieved of their posts while
 they were reassigned, with no stigma attached to the action. But to be
 relieved of one's post and at the same time put at the disposal of the
 Central Committee indicated that it was not clear whether one was
 going to be reassigned or left languishing while one's future was de-
 cided by party superiors. In practice, the Politburo essentially re-
 sponded that no decision had been taken regarding Khavkin and left
 open the possibility that he might be given another assignment. During
 the first half of 1937 to be relieved and put at the disposal of the
 Central Committee was a much more lenient punishment than to be
 dismissed, which usually entailed that one's career was finished and
 that one was likely to be arrested. In addition, the Politburo's assertion
 of its authority over the dispensation of Khavkin ("place him under
 the jurisdiction of the Central Committee") suggests that it felt that
 15. Tribuna, no. 8(229) (30 April 1937): 4-8 and no. 11(232) (15June 1937): 3-5.
 16. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 3, Protokoly Politbiuro, ed. khr. 987, 44.
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 his local opponents might ignore its decision and continue to stalk
 him. Clearly the Politburo had not yet determined Khavkin's fate; in-
 deed, one could conclude that it was trying to shield him.
 The decision of the Politburo quickly reached party officials in
 Khabarovsk who approved the resolution at a meeting four days later.
 However, the punishment meted out to Khavkin did not placate those
 party activists who were critical of him. They continued their attack
 and even turned their attention to Josif Vareikis who, as head of the
 Party in the Far Eastern Territory, was held personally responsible for
 the kraikom's "toothless" and "liberal" decisions. Several in attendance
 at the meeting expressed their annoyance that the "strict reprimand"
 (strogii vygovor) given to Khavkin was not recorded in his personnel file.
 P. G. Moskatov, representative of the Party Control Commission in the
 Far Eastern Territory, whose responsibilities included supervising the
 purges, expressed his displeasure with the kraikom's failure to adopt
 stricter measures against Khavkin. Yet, despite charges of embezzle-
 ment and other crimes, on 20 May the kraikom approved Khavkin's
 request for an all-expense paid vacation at a resort.17 The fact that
 Vareikis and the kraikom were following a Politburo directive and there-
 fore were without choice did not deter their critics who continued to
 clamor for Khavkin's purge at the Second Party Conference of theJAR
 (21-26 May) and the Twelfth Party Conference of the Far Eastern Ter-
 ritory, held in late May and earlyJune.
 At the Second Party Conference delegates from throughout theJAR
 elaborated on the accusations that had already been lodged against
 Khavkin since early April. For example, speakers noted that Josif Li-
 berberg, who had been purged as head of government in the JAR in
 August 1936, and Khavkin each knew that the other was a trotskyite
 and that they competed with each other for political supremacy in the
 JAR. Khavkin was condemned for "major political mistakes . . . and
 anti-state activities, and for the systematic perversion of party decisions
 and principles of bolshevik leadership." All the deficiencies and short-
 comings of life in theJAR were attributed to Khavkin, whose trotskyite
 proclivities helped the enemies of the Soviet Union. Khavkin routinely
 forced people to sign false denunciations of those whom he considered
 a threat to his power and authority. Moreover, his "1923 mistake was
 not an accident," as Fedor Stasiukov, head of the Department of Lead-
 ing Organs in the JAR, asserted. Finally, Khavkin supposedly had kept
 his trotskyite literature with a relative in Moscow for safekeeping until
 fall 1936.18 The conference concluded that Khavkin must be expelled
 from the Party and brought up on criminal charges. One conference
 resolution stated that the "kraikom is not heeding the voice of our
 17. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5439, 7-9 and 121; Tikhookea'nskaia zvezda (2 June
 1937); Suturin, Delo kraevogo masshtaba, 122-24 and idem, "Bez viny vinovatye," Biro-
 bidzhanskaia zvezda (19 May 1989).
 18. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21 and d. 22 for the stenographic account of the
 conference. The quotes are from d. 21, 28 and d. 22, 21, respectively.
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 organization. . . . The kraikom must review its decision and appeal to
 the Central Committee. It must expel Khavkin from the Party and turn
 him over for trial."'9 Chief Inspector of the Party Control Commission
 in the Far Eastern Territory, Beliaev, lent his weight to the attack on
 Khavkin and the kraikom when he noted that, as of early April, "it was
 clear to every party member that Khavkin could not remain as party
 secretary one more day." He insisted that it was also "clear to the party
 masses but not to the kraikom, which did not bother to send anyone to
 check on the charges against Khavkin," that, as a trotskyite, he should
 be expelled and prosecuted. Beliaev also criticized Vareikis for order-
 ing in April a halt to attacks on Khavkin; the obvious implication was
 that the party chief of the Far Eastern Territory was protecting a trot-
 skyite. In an effort to apply pressure on higher party authorities and
 embarrass Vareikis, he concluded:
 Khavkin is a nomenklatura worker of the Central Committee, but if the
 kraikom were aware of the real situation in theJAR and the full picture
 of Khavkin's crimes, then it would have already had the sanction of
 the Central Committee to expel Khavkin from the Party and bring
 him to criminal responsibility. This is what the district party groups
 want. If only the kraikom would listen to the party masses as the Cen-
 tral Committee and Comrade Stalin demand. It is only unclear to the
 kraikom that Khavkin cannot be in the Party. Khavkin remains as party
 secretary . . . and all this has disoriented the obkom and caused con-
 fusion. I am sure that the kraikom will reconsider its decision and do
 what it must ....
 Beliaev then declared, "Personally I will not rest until Khavkin is ex-
 pelled from the Party."20
 The Far Eastern Territory Party Conference held immediately after
 the JAR's conference did not resolve the issue of Khavkin but only
 provided another venue for attacks on him and the kraikom.21 However,
 it also offered Vareikis the opportunity to rebut those who had been
 challenging his political judgment. In his closing remarks to the con-
 ference, he reasoned that if Khavkin employed "trotskyite methods"
 in his work, then he had to belong to a trotskyite organization and
 engage in espionage and sabotage because "trotskyites are conspira-
 tors, spies and saboteurs who now use only these methods." Vareikis
 conceded that Khavkin was guilty of concealing his past from the Party
 until 1937, but he also argued that Khavkin was not a trotskyite since
 not one of his accusers had offered evidence of his being a spy. 22
 Vareikis's speech succeeded in shifting the attention away from Khav-
 kin by playing upon the spy hysteria that had already been whipped
 19. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21, 20.
 20. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 22, 17-18. See also CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, ed. khr.
 5381, 217-21 and ed. khr. 5385, 182-83.
 21. For the stenogr-aphic account of the confer-enlce, see CC-ORPO, f. 17, o01. 21,
 ed. khr. 5381-5386.
 22. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, ed. khr. 5382, 200.
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 up by a recent article in Pravda warning about espionage in the Soviet
 far east.23
 Despite all the fireworks at the various party meetings in the JAR
 and Far Eastern Territory from April to earlyJune, the critics of Khav-
 kin did not succeed in stripping him of his party card. The campaign
 against him ceased for the duration of summer and into fall 1937 when
 his political fate was finally determined. Available sources do not allow
 us to determine with precision when he was arrested by the security
 police but existing evidence indicates that he probably fell into the
 clutches of the NKVD in the aftermath of the arrest of Vareikis, who
 was seized in early October in connection with the purge of the Red
 Army.24 Revived attacks on Khavkin and his "protector" Vareikis began
 to appear on the pages of Tikhookeanskaia zvezda in mid-October, which
 suggests that the party leadership may have finally decided what to do
 with him. On 11-12 October a plenum of the obkom of theJAR resolved
 that it "considers it utterly impermissible that a clear enemy of the
 people, former secretary of the obkom Khavkin, remains free" and still
 retains his party card. According to a speech at the Third Party Con-
 ference of the JAR in 1938, the NKVD had uncovered evidence of a
 "counterrevolutionary organization under Khavkin" in September/Oc-
 tober 1937. The obkom requested the kraikom to turn over all material
 about the "enemy activities of Khavkin" to the Central Committee
 which should expel him from the Party and bring him up on criminal
 charges. It was not until late December 1937 that party organizations
 in the JAR expelled Khavkin from the Party as an enemy of the people,
 but by then he was already behind bars.25
 Khavkin languished in prison until January 1941 when, after three
 military tribunals, he was given a sentence of fifteen years under article
 58.7 of the criminal code for undermining the economy for counter
 revolutionary purposes. By this time a series of interrogators had sub-
 jected him to countless beatings which resulted in a loss of several
 teeth and an injury to his spine. He was sent to a labor camp where
 his childhood apprenticeship as a tailor made him indispensable to
 the prison guards who depended on him to sew tunics for them. This
 skill, along with his ability to organize clothing production for the
 camp, enabled him to survive the rigors of camp life until the early
 1950s when he was released from the gulag. He was then exiled to
 Kazakhstan where he again helped organize a clothing workshop, a
 service for which he received in 1955 a certificate (pochetnaia gramota)
 honoring his contribution to local industry. In early 1956 Khavkin's
 sentence was overturned and he was permitted to return to Moscow
 where he was given an apartmnent and invited to rejoin the Party. In
 23. I thank John Stephan for the information about the article in Pravda.
 24. D. D. Lappo, "Stoikii leninets (Stranitsy zhizni i deiatel'nosti I. M Vareikisa),"
 Volprosy istorii KPSS, no. 11 (1963): 100-5.
 25. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (16 October 1937 and 17 October 1937); PAOEAO, f.
 1, op. 1, d. 23, 19 and d. 37, 12-13; Suturin, Delo kraevogo masshtaba, 125.
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 an ultimate display of irony, Khavkin was awarded the Order of Lenin
 in 1967. He died sometime in the 1980s.26
 What does this brief account of Khavkin's travails reveal about the
 purge process in general? First, it points out the difficulty in deter-
 mining the relative weights to be assigned to central party authorities
 and local party activists when considering attacks on a particular per-
 son. On the one hand, the fact that the Central Committee and Polit-
 buro apparently had no firm and set plan in April and May 1937
 regarding the fate of Khavkin does not necessarily mean that he was
 removed from his post as first party secretary only as a result of local
 pressure. The possibility exists that the inner sanctum of the Party was
 planning to move against Khavkin as early as March but did so only
 incrementally, in fits and starts. Before summer 1937, when arrests and
 executions reached their crescendo, it was not unusual for individuals
 targeted by Moscow to be stripped of their posts and remain free while
 a case was manufactured against them. Indeed, some regional party
 secretaries remained in their posts despite denunciation by Stalin and
 other Politburo members.27 Such a policy could explain why Khavkin
 remained at liberty even though his political star had begun to fall: his
 relatively lenient punishment may not have been the result of the cen-
 ter lagging behind the periphery but the consequence of Moscow plot-
 ting in a calculated manner each successive move against a regional
 party leader.
 There are several problems with this interpretation, however, not
 the least of which are the lack of substantiation and the preponderance
 of evidence which leads to another conclusion. The failure to arrest
 and execute Khavkin and others at the first sign of suspicion may have
 reflected indecision and even a lack of agreement among party leaders
 regarding the purges themselves. While leaders in Moscow may have
 initiated and encouraged the witch-hunts to ferret out class enemies,
 the existing materials on the JAR strongly indicate that the center
 lagged behind the periphery in calling for his purge. Even though it
 is difficult to ascertain what those Central Comnmittee members re-
 sponsible for overseeing the purge of nomenklatura officials were doing
 behind the scenes, their action regarding Khavkin suggests that the
 party leadership was taken by surprise by his confession and had no
 detailed list of individuals to be purged. Pressure from below targeted
 individuals for denunciation, particularly after the February-March
 1937 plenum unleashed rank-and-file members and actively solicited
 their criticism of superiors. Khavkin's survival is a clear sign that
 confessions of one's past "political crimes" did not automatically trans-
 late into signing one's death warrant, at least in spring 1937.
 Getty and Rittersporn conclude that the center responded to cues
 and pressures from the periphery as much as it tried to control events
 26. lakubson; Exhibit at the Museum of the Jewish Autonomous Region.
 97. See Rittersporn, "Soviet Politics in the 1930s," 118; Getty, The Origins of the
 Great PArges, 178.
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 in the far-flung reaches of the Soviet Union. What we know about the
 reaction of Khavkin's enemies at the various party meetings and con-
 ferences in May and June buttresses their conclusions that the de-
 nunciation of superiors from below was more than a facade designed
 to provide the appearance of rank-and-file power and influence.28 To
 be sure, Khavkin's political fate ultimately depended on the decision
 of the purge commissions, security forces and Politburo, but the vo-
 ciferous condemnation of Khavkin and Vareikis by those displeased
 with the Politburo decision underscores the fact that many rank-and-
 file party members took seriously the injunction of the February-March
 plenum to unmask and depose party officials (including those ap-
 pointed by the center) through denunciation and criticism. Despite the
 fact that the hands of Vareikis and the kraikom were tied by the decision
 of the Politburo, Khavkin's detractors, including representatives of the
 Central Committee's Party Control Commission and Department of
 Leading Party Organs, remained undaunted in their thirst for the
 purge. Surely they knew that someone in Khavkin's position could be
 removed only by a decision emanating from the very top of the Party;
 nonetheless, they continued their campaign in the hope that higher
 party organizations would accede to pressure.
 Another conclusion to be drawn from this examination of Khavkin
 is that the purges depended in no small measure on the successful
 mobilization of the rank and file against entrenched local party ma-
 chines. Michael Gelb argues that the verification campaign "reflected
 the populist face of Stalinism" by "eliciting mass participation in po-
 litical life."29 A major argument found in recent research is that the
 national elites depended on the rank-and-file membership in their cam-
 paign to assert central control over obdurate regional officials who
 refused to implement directives of the Central Committee and who
 had set themselves up as mini-potentates ruling with the help of local
 cliques or "families" of dedicated assistants.30 In the case of the JAR,
 Khavkin's close circle of associates (termed an "artel"' by his detrac-
 tors), whom he had brought with him from Smolensk, also fell victim
 to the security forces by the end of 1937: of the 51 members of the
 JAR's obkom in mid-1937, only six retained their membership one year
 later.31
 28. In his recent book Stalin in Power, Robert Tucker, who is hardly sympathetic
 to the views of Getty and Rittersporn, agrees that the February-March plenum was
 designed to stir LIp the rank-and-file membership against its immediate superiors.
 However, he views the plenum as a cynical maneuver by Stalin, with little or no
 connection to the struggle between the national and regional leaderships that animates
 the approaches of Getty and Rittersporn. See Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution
 from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), chap. 17, especially 459 and
 464-65.
 29. Michael Gelb, "Mass Politics Under Stalinism: Two Case Studies." John Strong,
 ed., Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (Columbus: Slavica, 1990), 188-89.
 30. See the sources listed in note 1.
 31. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21, 4-5 and d. 37, 3.
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 But the fact that many of Khavkin's second lieutenants remained
 at their posts even after their boss was stripped of his position and
 were arrested only when Khavkin himself was is evidence that the JAR
 was not yet targeted in spring 1937. The pronouncements and policies
 of the national leadership certainly provided the opportunity for the
 grassroots campaign against Khavkin but the available sources do not
 support the conclusions that a "hit" list existed and the purge of the
 Party in the JAR was predetermined. The failure in the spring of Mal-
 enkov's envoys to have Khavkin arrested is strong proof that the Cen-
 tral Committee had not yet determined his fate, notwithstanding the
 protestations of officials such as Moskatov and Beliaev who were su-
 pervising the purges in the JAR at the behest of the center. There is
 no doubt that these representatives of the Central Committee were
 targeting Khavkin but neither they nor Malenkov at that time evidently
 had the upper hand in determining the fate of theJAR's first secretary.
 Despite the evidence mounting against Khavkin in April and May,
 which was collected by emissaries of the Central Committee itself, the
 Politburo nonetheless chose to deal with Khavkin in a lenient manner,
 suggesting splits within the party leadership regarding the organiza-
 tion, implementation and targets of the purges in the first half of 1937.
 The Khavkin affair served purposes other than rooting out sus-
 pected class enemies and unseating ensconced political cliques. De-
 spite the personal tragedies that befell many party members in the
 aftermath of the February-March plenum, the campaign did have a
 beneficial effect. Not only did it allow disgruntled activists, particularly
 those with opportunistic bents and scores to settle, to vent steam and
 accuse their superiors of poor work and leadership, but it also pro-
 vided a sense of empowerment to party members who were given the
 opportunity at the party conferences in May and June to engage in
 scathing criticism of Khavkin and his "artel'." All sorts of resentments,
 frustrations and complaints came to the fore when party activists, either
 seeking to advance their careers or merely acting out of a desire for
 self-preservation as the maelstrom of the purges swirled all around
 them in the Soviet far east, were encouraged to criticize their superiors.
 The stenographic reports of the Second Party Conference of the JAR
 and the Twelfth Party Conference of the Far Eastern Territory contain
 dozens of speeches by managers of factories, collective farms, schools,
 construction sites and the like who placed responsibility for all the
 shortcomings and failings of socialist construction in the JAR on the
 doorstep of Khavkin. It is little wonder that everybody connected with
 the Party's effort to manage all aspects of social, cultural and economic
 life in the JAR sought to lessen their own responsibility for abysmal
 conditions by shifting blame to a confessed trotskyite. This sense of
 being able to influence local affairs while escaping personal respon-
 sibility was translated into greater rank-and-file support for Stalin and
 the central leadership, who benefited from the willingness of party
 members to blame an individual local leader rather than the stalinist
 system itself. The campaign of criticism and denunciation also served
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 the national leadership's interests by shifting the spotlight from its
 failed policies to supposed "enemies of the people" who were seeking
 to destroy the Soviet Union from within. It kept all party members
 guessing as to who, as a result of association with Khavkin or one of
 his associates, might be the next victim.
 What role did the peculiarlyJewish nature of the JAR play in the
 purge process? That is, did it matter that Khavkin and others were
 Jewish? Examination of party materials in archives in Birobidzhan and
 Moscow indicates that, for the most part, in the JAR one's ethnicity
 had little or no impact on whether one fell victim to the Great Terror.
 If the purge was designed to eliminateJews from the ranks of the Party
 in the JAR, then we might expect fewer Jews at subsequent party con-
 ferences; however, the percentage of Jews attending party conferences
 in the JAR remained constant at about thirty percent between 1935
 and 1938.32 Khavkin and his associates were targeted not because they
 wereJewish but because they were politically suspect. Nonetheless, past
 involvement inJewish political causes, such as membership in the Bund
 or a Zionist organization before or just after the revolution, was some-
 times used against party members in th-e mid-1930s, who found them-
 selves accused of "counter revolutionary trotskyite, bourgeois nation-
 alist activities." This was particularly if they concealed this information
 from the purge commissions.33
 Purge victims also found that association with Josif Liberberg,
 whose involvement withJewish concerns was a significant factor in his
 downfall as head of the JAR's government, could be used against them.
 In 1928 Liberberg helped found the Jewish Cultural Institute in Kiev
 and then moved to the JAR when it was formally established in 1934.
 He was later accused of trotskyism and bourgeois nationalism for at-
 tempting to establish the JAR as the center of Jewish culture in the
 Soviet Union. He was also accused of replacing Russian workers in one
 factory withJews because he allegedly believed thatJews should occupy
 important positions in the JAR.34 One party member who worked
 closely with Liberberg was purged because in 1934 he had advocated
 the russification of Yiddish, hardly a sign of blind commitment to
 Jewish causes. As the purge commission concluded, "This harmful po-
 sition was the result of a lack of faith in the development of the Yiddish
 language and Yiddish culture in a proletarian dictatorship."35 And in
 Khavkin's case, the party chief's working relationship with Liberberg
 was twisted into evidence of his political unreliability and failure to
 weed out trotskyites.
 32. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5538, 14-15 and d. 5539, 16; PAOEAO, f. I, op. 1,
 d. 21, 24.
 33. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5547, 95, and d. 5552, 38.
 34. Tribuna, no. 9 (230) (15 May 1937): 3-7; CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5550, 58;
 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Evreiskoi Avtonomtinoi Oblasti, f. 75, op. 1, d. 63, 1; PAOEAO, f. 1,
 op. 1, d. 11, 58, d. 15, 15, and d. 21, 75; Benjamin Pinkus, TheJews of the Soviet Union:
 The History of a National Minority (Cambridge: Cambriclge University Press, 1988), 125.
 35. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5551, 97-98.
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 Finally, to end on a tragi-comic note, perhaps the most glaring
 example of someone falling victim because of his or her Jewishness
 was Khavkin's wife, Sofia Pavlovich, who was accused of trying to poi-
 son Lazar' Kaganovich with homemade gefilte fish when he came for
 dinner in 1936 while inspecting the JAR. She was arrested along with
 Khavkin, sentenced to a labor camp and eventually ended up in a
 mental hospital.36
 In conclusion, lack of detailed information about the decision-mak-
 ing process in the Politburo, especially in the case of the Great Terror,
 makes it difficult to know what, if anything, the party leadership in the
 Kremlin was planning to do with Khavkin. Stalin and his closest as-
 sociates encouraged a generalized rank-and-file attack on local party
 leaders and it was no coincidence that party activists in the JAR began
 criticizing Khavkin in the wake of the February-March plenum. There-
 fore culpability for the purges belongs to the Kremlin. But contrary to
 the conclusions of investigators like Alexander Suturin, who stresses
 that initiative, direction and guidance from Moscow explain the tar-
 geting of Khavkin and other purge victims, the available materials
 concerning the purges in the JAR suggest that Moscow was not yet
 focused on Khavkin in spring 1937.37 Ultimate responsibility for what
 happened in the JAR and throughout the Soviet Union during the
 Great Terror resides in the Politburo and especially with Stalin, but
 understanding the course of specific purges requires that we take into
 account local events and personalities. More specifically, careful atten-
 tion must be paid to the interaction between the center and the pe-
 riphery and how news and information about events in theJAR influ-
 enced decision making in Moscow. Thus, local circumstances helped
 determine Khavkin's fate as did the machinations of party leaders be-
 hind the walls of the Kremlin.
 36. Exhibit at the Museum of the JAR.
 37. Suturin writes that "the first steps in beginning to unmask enemies" in the
 JAR did not occur as a result of "initiative from below, but from massive pressure
 from above." See "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (12 May, 1989).
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